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THE SPAGHETTI BOWL OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS
AND THE DECLINING RELEVANCE OF THE WTO
Brad Kloewer*
I. INTRODUCTION
The renowned economist and prolific scholar Jagdish Bhagwati once
famously referred to the variety of preferential trade agreements ("PTAs") in the
world as a "spaghetti bowl" phenomenon, wherein the diversity of trade
arrangements between nations and regions makes for a confusing and convoluted
mess.' The metaphor is apt, he argued, because the increasingly fragmented nature
of these varying accords means each transaction must be traced from its origin
through a twisting maze of diverse regimes before ever arriving at its destination.2
These arrangements are difficult for even seasoned practitioners to untangle, and
doubly so for the lay observer.
The confusion these agreements provoke is no surprise, especially when one
considers that this multiplicity of norms was precisely what the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") was ostensibly designed to avert. Of course the WTO is an
extremely complicated institution, but the order it espouses is fundamentally
premised on two basic principles: National Treatment and Most Favored Nation.
3
The principle of national treatment is essentially a requirement that imports be
treated the same as domestically produced goods, whereas the most favored nation
principle requires that all trade benefits offered from one nation to another must be
similarly extended to all other nations.4 These principles, in turn, are premised on
the widely accepted belief that liberalizing trade and reducing barriers such as
tariffs leads to benefits for everyone involved.5  Preferential trade agreements
* Brad Kloewer is a recent graduate from the University of Denver Sturm College of Law. He received
his BA in International Affairs from the University of Colorado in 2008. After working for the
Environmental Secretariat of the Central American Free Trade Agreement in Guatemala City, Brad won
the Sutton Writing Competition in 2015 and was awarded a scholarship to study at The Hague
Academy of International Law in The Netherlands.
1. CFR's Jagdish Bhagwati Argues Against Preferential Trade Agreements in New Book;
Recommends Completion of Multilateral Doha Round, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (July 16,
2008), http://www.cfr.org/world/cfrs-jagdish-bhagwati-argues-against-preferential-trade-agreements-
new-book-recommends-completion-multilateral-doha-round/p16798.
2. Jagdish Bhagwati, US Trade Policy: The Infatuations with FTAs, in THE DANGEROUS
OBSESSION WITH FREE TRADE AREAS (Claude Barfielde ed., 1995).
3. Warren H. Maruyama, Preferential Trade Arrangements and the Erosion of the WTO 's MFN
Principle, 46 STAN. J. INT'L L. 177, 179 (2010).
4. Id.
5. Why Trade is Good for You, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 1998,
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("PTAs"), however, obviously confer additional benefits: benefits that exceed
those offered to every other "most favored nation." As a result, these agreements
essentially amount to more-than-most or even most-most favored treatment.
The Marrakech Agreement, 6 which created the WTO in 1995 and subsumed
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") 7 as well as the General
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"), 8 allows for the creation of PTAs given
that certain conditions are met. These provisions are intended to prevent an
unwieldy diversity of international trade norms, but, as will be more thoroughly
discussed below, scholars from around the world have seriously questioned their
effectiveness. In fact, an incredible and unprecedented proliferation of PTAs has
been proceeding almost unabated since the inception of the WTO, leading to a
substantial number of these agreements having been reported to the WTO by
2014.9
In his often-cited commentary of the subject from nearly two decades ago,
Professor Bhagwati warned that if the proliferation of PTAs continued, "it is likely
that the dilution of the multilateral trading regime by the spaghetti bowl of
preferential trade agreements will be our fate."'10 With the benefit of nearly twenty
years of hindsight, can we yet determine if he was right? This paper will contend
not only that Professor Bhagwati's prescience was well-founded, but moreover that
the proliferation of PTAs was an inevitable course of action for a world not yet
willing or able to accept a global system of homogenous norms.
Part Two will establish some context by looking at the requirements of Article
XXIV of the GATT, the Enabling Clause, and the surprising but telling paucity of
WTO Appellate Body jurisprudence on the topic. Part Three will highlight and
address some of the most prominent factors that may lead a country or region to
engage in PTAs despite the WTO's more comprehensive umbrella. Part Four will
look at specific examples of global realities in existence today and explain how
these circumstances are demonstrative of a world order that isn't ready or able to
submit to a trade regime governed by the standards of the WTO.
II. GATT AND PTAs
Despite their undeniable departure from the Most Favored Nation principle,
and the trade distorting effects that result, different provisions of the GATT do in
http://www.economist.com/node/605144.
6. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; see generally General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XXIV, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187,33 1.L.M. 1153.
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187,33 L.L.M.
1153 [hereinafter GATT 1994].
8. General Agreement on Trade in Services, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 11B, 33 I.L.M. 1167, art. XIV [hereinafter GATS].
9. See generally, List of PTAs, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://ptadb.wto.org/ptaList.aspx (last
visited Mar. 4, 2016). See also Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/englishtratope/ regione/region e.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
10. Bhagwati, supra note 2, at 20.
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fact permit the formation of PTAs. The Enabling Clause, for example, allows for
deviations from the Most Favored Nation principle for "[r]egional or global
arrangements entered into amongst less-developed contracting parties for the
mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs."' 1 This provision obviously applies only
to agreements between developing countries, however, so the far more common
mechanism under which these arrangements are allowed is Article XXIV, which
lays out the criteria for three different allowable types of PTAs: customs unions,
free trade agreements ("FTAs"), and interim agreements.12
A. Article XXIV
The substantive portions of Article XXIV are found in paragraphs 5 through
9. As a preliminary matter, Paragraph 5 emphasizes that while GATT rules do not
prevent the creation of PTAs, they do limit the manner in which they can
function.' 3 More specifically, the formation of a PTA cannot justify an increase in
any sort of barriers to trade-notably tariffs-to states not party to the PTA.
14
That is, PTAs can only function to reduce barriers to trade between the states that
engage in them. They cannot act as a wall to shut out the rest of the world.
Paragraph 6 requires that if a state does embark on a PTA that leads to duties or
tariffs increasing for any bound tariff item, that state must formulate some means
of compensation in line with the requirements of GATT Article XXVIII.
15
Paragraph 7 requires WTO members to notify the WTO whenever they intend to
join a PTA, and further stipulates that those agreements must be reviewed to
ensure that they do not violate other provisions of the GATT. 16
Paragraph 8 is especially important because it explains the different types of
PTAs and establishes rules for their implementation. Paragraph 8(a) deals with
customs unions and requires that within a custom union, barriers to trade must be
eliminated for "substantially all trade" taking place between its members.17 For
trade taking place outside a custom union, however, members must maintain
"substantially" uniform regulations with respect to all third parties. 18 A custom
union also must not result in higher tariffs for the group than existed before.'
9
Equally relevant to this discussion is paragraph 8(b), which address FTAs.2 ° Here
the requirements are very similar. Within the FTA, barriers to trade must be
eliminated for "substantially all trade" between members, and the FTA must not
11. World Trade Organization, Different and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, 11 2(c), WTO Doc. No. 114903 (Nov. 28, 1979),
https://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/tokyo enabling e.pdf [hereinafter Enabling Clause].
12. See GATT 1994, supra note 7, at art. XXIV. For the purposes of this article, the umbrella
term "PTA" is intended to encompass all three of these arrangements.
13. GATT 1994, supra note 7, at art. XXIV, 5.
14. Id.
15. Id. at art. XXIV, 1 6.
16. Id. at art. XXIV, 7.
17. Id. at art. XXIV, 11 8(a).
18. Id. at art. XXIV, 8(b).
19. Maruyama, supra note 3, at 181.
20. GATT 1994, supra note 7, at art. XXIV, 8(b).
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result in an increase in barriers to third parties.2'
B. WTO Jurisprudence on Article XXIV
The dizzying proliferation of PTAs has continued unabated for over two
decades. In 1990, the GATT had only received notification of forty regional trade
agreements ("RTAs") then in existence.22 By June of 2014, however, that number
had skyrocketed to 585.23 In addition, bilateral investment treaties, which typically
grant preferential treatment between only two states, have similarly seen an
unprecedented growth in popularity, with more than 2,265 having been signed
since 1989.24 FTAs too have become increasingly common in recent years, with
every WTO member (with the exception of Mongolia) being party to at least one
FTA, and with the average WTO member being party to thirteen such
agreements.
25
With all this expansion, one would expect the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
to have produced volumes of commentary on the proper interpretation of Article
XXIV. In reality, the Appellate Body has had remarkably little to say on the topic.
Despite the explosion of PTA formation around the world, the Appellate Body has
never directly interpreted one of the most fundamental elements of Article
XXIV-the meaning of the "substantially all" requirement -nor has there ever
been consensus as to whether this term should be understood as a percentage or as
something else.27
The leading case dealing with Article XXIV at the WTO is Turkey - Textiles,
wherein Turkey sought to impose a quota on imports of Indian textiles in order to
join a customs union with the European Communities. 28 Turkey had ostensibly
imposed the quotas in order to prevent Indian textiles that had been imported into
Turkey from then being immediately shipped onward into Europe, which would
violate the European Communities' more restrictive quotas on Indian imports.2 9
Without addressing the more pressing questions regarding the ways in which
Custom Unions themselves violate the Most Favored Nation principle and thereby
potentially undermine the WTO regime itself, the Appellate Body ruled simply that
Article XXIV can be used as a valid defense to trade distorting practices only if it
meets two conditions. 30 "First, the party claiming the benefit of this defence must
21. Id.
22. Mohammad F.A. Nsour, Abdullah Dmour, & Lana Nimri, Trends in Free Trade: Legal and
Policy Perspectives on Jordan's Regional Trade Arrangements, 24 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 313,
313 (2014).
23. Bhagwati, supra note 2.
24. Chris Brummer, The Ties that Bind? Regionalism, Commercial Treaties, and the Future of
Global Economic Integration, 60 VAND. L. REv. 1349, 1363 (2007).
25. Maruyama, supra note 3, at 193.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 184.
28. ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
338, 338-42 (WOLTERs KLUWER, 2D ED. 2012).
29. Id.
30. Appellate Body Report, Turkey -Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,
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demonstrate that the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a
customs union that fully meets the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of
Article XXIV.''31 Second, "that party must demonstrate that the formation of that
customs union would be prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure
at issue." 32 The Appellate Body ruled that, because Turkey and the European
Communities could have introduced a rule of origin regime to determine the origin
of those textiles, then the import quota could not be justified. This determination
did little-if anything-to address the larger and more pressing issues.
Perhaps even more surprising than the lack of guidance on how countries
should go about avoiding the trade distorting effects of PTAs is the almost total
silence on whether and when notified PTAs meet the requirements of Article
XXIV. As already mentioned, paragraph 7 of Article XXIV requires that states
notify the WTO of any such agreements so that they may be reviewed for
compliance.33  In acknowledgement of the increasing demand for such
assessments, the WTO established the Regional Trade Agreements Committee
("RTAC") in February of 1996.34 However, in nearly twenty years of operation,
the RTAC has only reached consensus on one such agreement, that between the
Czech Republic and Slovakia after the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993. 35
III. WHY FORM A PTA?
But why would anyone want to undermine a system that economists laud by
violating the very principles on which that system is based? If the models are
correct, then a global economy wherein every state has equal trading benefits with
every other would promise to improve everyone's lot; after all, "a rising tide lifts
all boats."36 It turns out that there are many reasons why a state might prefer
regional or bilateral arrangements over the global norms proffered by the WTO. A
handful of the most prevalent will be discussed below.
Before delving into those, it may help to ground our considerations in a study
from a slightly different branch of economics that professors from the University
of Miami and the Harvard School of Public Health conducted nearly two decades
ago.37 Researchers there asked subjects a simple question: Assuming that prices
remained at their current levels and that the purchasing power of money did not
change, would they rather have a yearly income of $50,000 in a society where
10, WTO Doe. WT/DS34/AB/R (adopted Nov. 19, 1999).
31. Id. 158.
32. Id.
33. GATT 1994, supra note 7, at art. XXIV, 11 7.
34. Rules: Regional Agreements, Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min05 e/briefe/brief09e.htm (last visited Dec. 4,
2014).
35. Id.
36. See TED SORENSEN, COUNSELOR: A LIFE AT THE EDGE OF HISTORY 227 (2008) (explaining
the phrase "A rising tide lifts all the boats" came from an New England Council regional chamber of
commerce).
37. Sara J. Solnick & David Hemenway, Is more always better?: A Survey on Positional
Concerns, 37 J. OF ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373 (1998).
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others make only $25,000, or would they prefer to make $100,000 in a society
where others make $200,000?38 Shockingly for economists, 50% of respondents
preferred to live in the former society rather than the latter.
39
This example is intended to highlight what economists so often prefer to
overlook: the real world does not function as cleanly or as rationally as theory
would suggest. Put simply, different people find different things to be more
valuable than money, and material comfort is only one of various considerations
that can affect the decision making process. To state the premise a bit more
bluntly as it pertains to world trade, for many, global welfare means little when
compared to national welfare, especially when considerations such as power and
influence come into play. As the numbers above suggest, many people are willing
to sacrifice greater comfort for both themselves and others if it means that they can
secure a position of influence or power.
A. Foreign Policy
All countries have political aspirations. Large, powerful countries seek to
expand and solidify the power they can wield over others while small, relatively
powerless countries seek to improve on their positions relative not only to more
powerful countries, but also in relation to their peers. Here, too, "better" is often
understood not in comparison to a former version of self, but rather in comparison
to a current version of others.
With this in mind, the vast expansion of PTAs throughout the world should
come as no surprise. Not only are poor, developing countries signing on to PTAs
with their similarly situated neighbors and more distant nations alike, but so too are
the most powerful nations in the world expanding their base of trade agreements. 40
In fact, the United States is one of the leaders of this global trend, having signed
free trade agreements with twenty different countries, and plans for more on the
41way.
Trade agreements strengthen ties between countries.42 They can lead not only
to a deepening of economic codependence, but also to greater political
cooperation, as clearly demonstrated by the European Union ("EU").43 They can
establish relationships that can later be utilized to expand cooperation on matters of
national security or more overtly political machinations at institutions like the
38. Id. at 377.
39. ld. at 378.
40. See generally, Leonardo Baccini & Johannes Urpelainen, Preferential Trading Agreements:
Helping Economic Reform in Developing Countries, VOX, http://www.voxeu.org/article/preferential-
trading-agreements-helping-economic-reform-developing-countries, (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
41. See generally, Free Trade Agreements, INTER'L TRADE ADMIN., http://trade.gov/fta/ (last
visited Dec. 4, 2014).
42. Bhagwati, supra note 2.
43. See John McCormick, Ten Reasons Why the European Union is a Good Idea, JOHN
MCCORMICK ABOUT EUR. AND THE EUR. UNION, http://johnmccormick.eu/2013/09/ten-reasons-why-
the-european-union-is-a-good-idea/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
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U.N.44  They can even buy leverage to discourage sanctions for unpopular
behavior, as is readily demonstrated by European reluctance to jeopardize the flow
of Russian oil over the crisis in Ukraine. 45
PTAs between a select number of nations can also serve another useful
political purpose by pitting regions against one another in ideological battles.
Venezuela's decision to leave the Andean Community in favor of Mercosur,4 6 or
Russia's ongoing efforts to establish a customs union with Kazakhstan and
Belarus 47 are fitting examples of this trend.
B. Deficiencies in the WTO
Many countries prefer to establish PTAs on a regional or bilateral basis
because those agreements feature elements that are lacking or inefficient at the
WTO. The most obvious example of this sort of shortcoming is the incredible
amount of time required to arrive at a consensus in the WTO. 48 The Doha Round
of trade negotiations began thirteen years ago, and prospects remain bleak for any
near-term resolution of its most contentious issues. 49 PTAs, on the other hand, can
be negotiated much more quickly, and with far fewer voices clamoring to be
heard.5°
Another glaring omission pertains to the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body,
which is only empowered to hear complaints from states.51 This leaves investment
disputes between private parties, or between private parties and states, completely
unattended to. 52 An international trade regime that does not provide a mechanism
for settling disputes with private parties is practically begging for alternative
44. Richard Feinberg, The Political Economy of United States' Free Trade Arrangements, 26
WORLD ECONOMY 1019, 1038 (2003).
45. Charlemagne, Europe, Russia, and Sanctions: Limp wrist diplomacy?, THE ECONOMIST (Mar.
21, 2014), http://www.economist.com/bIogs/charlemagne/2014/03/europe-russia-and-sanctions.
46. Brummer, supra note 24, at 1380-90.
47. Boris N. Mamlyuk, Regionalizing Multilateralism: The Effect of Russia's Accession to the
WTO on Existing Regional Integration Schemes in the Former Soviet Space, 18 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 207, 210 (2014).
48. ABC OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, MONOGRAPHS ON GLOBALIZATION AND INDIA, MYTHS AND REALITIES,
14 (CUTS Centre for International Trade 2009).
49. Duncan Green, Doha round has run its course but new trade realities demand solutions, THE
GUARDIAN (May 4, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-
matters/201 /may/04/doha-trade-realities-demand-solutions. ABC OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, MONOGRAPHS ON GLOBALIZATION
AND INDIA, MYTHS AND REALITIES, 1114 (CUTS Centre for International Trade 2009).
50. Regional Trade Integration and Conflict Resolution (Shaheen R. Khan ed., 2009),
http://samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk/9781134023004_sample_509655.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
51. Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/disple.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
52. Alberto Alemanno, Private parties and WTO Dispute Settlement System (2004), Cornell Law
School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers. Paper I,
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=-Ips-clacp (last visited
Feb. 5,2016).
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institutions to step in. To fill this void, a variety of competing and often
overlapping institutions have sprung up over the years, including the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ"), 53 regional dispute settlement bodies such as the NAFTA
tribunals, 54 investor-state arbitration mechanisms such as the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), 55 and even municipal courts
applying local laws and the principles of comity.56 To be sure, this variety of
dispute settlement mechanisms has caused numerous problems of its own, not least
of which being duplication of hearings and often fragmentation of jurisdictions. 7
Nonetheless, these mechanisms are often preferable because they can at least
provide some sort of acceptable remedy for aggrieved parties. The WTO is only
empowered to provide prospective rather than retrospective remedies, and it can
only impose the burden for securing those remedies on states. 58  Most private
investors seek damages when they bring a complaint to one of these tribunals,
thereby rendering the DSB simply inadequate for the demands of many of the
global economy's most significant players.
59
C. Labor and the Environment
While it is true that the WTO does provide a number of exceptions under
GATT Article XX that pertain to non-economic state objectives such as protection
of public morals and public health concerns, 60 it is essentially silent on labor
standards and decidedly unhelpful in regards to environmental protections.
Currently, WTO rules and disciplines do not even apply to labor standards. 6 1
This is remarkable when one considers the enormous role that labor conditions
play in assessments of comparative advantage. More importantly, improvements
in labor standards are one of the most consistent and fundamental demands posed
by the electorates of many countries around the world, but especially those of
developing countries. 62  An absence or diminution of labor standards in one
53. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933.
54. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec, 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993); see also Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions, NAFTA SECRETARIAT,
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Overview-of-the-Dispute-Settlement-
Provisions#Chapterl I (last visited Apr. 20,2016).
55. About ICSID, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
56. Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public International Law: Why Competition Among
International Economic Law Tribunals Is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 246-56 (2007).
57. Id. at 258-61.
58. Thomas Sebastian, World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of
Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness, 48 HARV. INT'L L. J. 337,369 (2007).
59. Dan Sarooshi, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the World Trade Organization: What Role
for Systemic Values in the Resolution of International Economic Disputes? 49 TEX. INT'L L.J. 445, 461
(2014).
60. GATT 1994, supra note 7, at art. XX.
61. World Trade Organization, Briefing Note, Trade and Labour Standards: Subject of Intense
Debate., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min99 e/english/about-e/181ab-e.htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2016).
62. World Trade Organization, Briefing Note, Trade and Labour Standards: A Difficult Issue for
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country can cause serious tension for the workers of another country when they are
made to compete as though they were on an equal footing.63 This issue inevitably
poses political problems for the leaders of all WTO member states. The absence of
guidance ,on this most basic concern is why many post-WTO PTAs feature
agreements and the establishment of standards on this topic. 64 The side agreement
to NAFTA, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC"), is
an early example of the recognition that contracting parties to PTAs pay to this
political necessity. 65 Just over a decade later, the passage of the Central American
Free Trade Agreement ("CAFTA") expanded on this framework, including an
entire chapter on labor standards. 66 The efficacy of these mechanisms is hotly
debated,67 but these examples demonstrate the naivet6 that characterizes a trade
regime that pretends it can overlook such a foundational economic concern. Trade
agreements that omit this consideration are doomed to perceptions of inadequacy.
Another growing concern for the global economy is environmental
standards.68 These too play an enormous role in assessments of comparative
advantage. A country that does not protect its environment is far more appealing
for foreign investors than one that does, at least in many sectors such as mining,
logging, or chemical engineering (to name a few).69  Countries that have
painstakingly developed environmental protections are understandably weary of
being made to compete with countries that have not. As mentioned above, GATT
Article XX does in fact provide some protections under subsection (b) for states to
craft policy that is "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life",70 or under
subsection (g) for measures that are "relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption." 71 While these inclusions are
noteworthy, they hardly address the fundamental question of whether or not an
absence of environmental protections constitutes an unfair distortion of trade.
Moreover, a system in which countries can secure an advantage over others by
carelessly pillaging their own environment is tantamount to a race to the bottom
Many WTO Member Governments,
https://www.wto.orglenglish/thewto e/minist e/min0l e/brief e/briefl 6_e.htm.
63. Drusilla K. Brown, Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on the International Trade
Agenda?, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 89 (2001).
64. Samira Salem & Faina Rozental, Labor Standards and Trade: A Review of Recent Empirical
Evidence, J. INT'L COM & ECON. 1 (2012).
65. Frank H. Bieszczat, Labor Provisions in Trade Agreements: From the NAALC to Now, 83
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1387, 1388 (2008).
66. Central American-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Costa
Rica-Dom. Rep.-EI Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar., May 28, 2004, Chapter 16, 43 I.L.M. 51 [hereinafter
CAFTA].
67. Kimberly A. Elliott, Labor Standards, Development, and CAFTA, THE PETERSON INST. FOR
INT'L EcON. (2004), http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb04-2.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
68. PATRICK F. J. MACRORY ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 145 (2005).
69. Id.
70. GATT 1994, supra note 7, at art. XX, 1 b.
71. Id. at art. XX, 1 g.
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that many would prefer to avoid. For this reason, it is no surprise that more recent
PTAs such as CAFTA include an entire chapter on environmental protections and
a secretariat empowered to investigate state compliance.72 These things do matter
and they cannot be overlooked.
IV. THE WORLD TODAY
As already mentioned, the Doha Round of negotiations has been ongoing for
more than a decade, and few if any expect breakthroughs any time soon.73
Meanwhile, virtually every country in the world has gone about deepening its
network of trade relations in forums removed from the auspices of the WTO.74
This should come as no surprise, however, when one considers the stark contrasts
between the world of today and that of 1995. In the interim, the economies of
India, Brazil, and especially China, have grown at an incredible and unforeseeable
rate.75 World population has increased by over a billion. Left-leaning populists
have been elected across South America and Russia has reassumed a frequently
oppositional stance to Western initiatives. Global financial crises have shaken faith
in Western institutions and the dawn of the internet has altered how people from
around the world communicate and share information. 76  Climate change has
progressed to the point of inevitably pending crises. 77 The crafters of the WTO
seem to have anticipated none of the strains these developments would impose.
Perhaps when Francis Fukuyama declared "The End of History" in 1992, they
actually believed him.78 In any case, the WTO in its current form is unequipped to
act as the voice of authority that the world needs to resolve any of these pressing
global economic concerns. The world simply is not ready or even interested in
abiding by its norms.
A. The New Powers
When the Cold War ended, the United States assumed a position of
unprecedented power. 79 No nation could effectively counter its influence, and
72. CAFTA, supra note 66, Chapter 17.
73. Green, supra note 49.
74. Matthew Wilson, Friend or Foe? Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO, INT'L CTR. FOR
TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Feb. 1, 2008) http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/friend-
or-foe-regional-trade-agreements-and-the-wto.
75. Jerry Harris, Emerging Third World Powers: China, India and Brazil, 46 RACE & CLASS 7, 8
(2005),
http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/mia/users/Rachelle Cloutier/public/Drager/o20
Global%20Public%2OHealth/Harris%20Emerging%20third%20world%20powers%2OChina%2O India%
20Brazil.pdf.
76. Mindi Orth, Technology & How We Communicate, CHRON.COM,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/technology-communicate-27322.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
77. Ben Brumfield, Global warming is epic, long-term study says, CNN (Mar. 8, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/08/world/world-climate-change/.
78. See generally, FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992)
79. See generally, Kylie Poulin, Intervention from Above: The United States, Russia, and Power
Transition in the Middle East, IND. UNIV. DEP'T OF POL. SCi.,
http://polisci.indiana.edu/undergraduate/theses/Poulin.pdf.
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given its ascent to global dominance, few dared to question the wisdom of its
economic prescriptions. 80 Today, however, there are several nations that-while
not yet finding themselves on exactly equal footing with the U.S.-have secured
enough power and influence to resist and even counter the objectives of the United
States. Foremost amongst these powers is China.8 1 In 1995, China's GDP was
roughly $727 billion.82 Today, that number has skyrocketed to over $9 trillion.83
China holds over $1.3 trillion in U.S. debt. 84 Along with India and Russia, it
recently launched "The New Development Bank," which is intended to act as a
rival institution to the World Bank.85 Similar transformations are also happening
in various other developing countries.
86
These shifts have been very difficult to cope with for the Western powers that
crafted the WTO. When they designed the system, as already mentioned, they
likely did so under the impression that their power would somehow continue
unrivaled. Many commentators have made note of the irony this situation presents.
For example, it has been noted that "[t]he west, which has been the traditional
defender of free trade - because free trade always favors the most powerful and
advanced economies - is likely to run for cover and put up protectionist barriers,
unable to cope with the political, social and economic implications of the rise of
China.",87 Such a turn of events would clearly demonstrate that not even the U.S.
80. David Pierce, America in the Post War Period, STUDENT PULSE,
http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/2/americain-the-post-war-period?utmexpid=22625156
I .jO._KlIIQVuEPc9uLGsmiQ.0&utm referrer-https%3A%2F/o2Fwww.google.com (last visited
Feb.10, 2016).
81. See generally, Andrew Soergel, America 's Days Are Numbered as the World's Top Economy,
U.S.NEWS (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015-12-28/americas-days-are-
numbered-as-the-worlds-top-economy.
82. See Thitapha Wattanapruttipaisan, The Topology of ASEAN FTAs, with Special Reference to
IP-Related Provisions in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE ASIA-
PACIFIC REGION 109, 116, n. 14 (Christoph Antons et al. eds., 2015) (stating China's GDP was $700.2
billion in 1995); World Heritage Encyclopedia, Historical GDP of the People's Republic of China,
WORLD PUBLIC LIBRARY,
http://www.worldlibrary.org/articles/HistoricalGDP-of the People's Republic of China (last visited
Apr. 20, 2016) (providing "a list of China's historical domestic product (GDP) values").
83. Statistical Communique of the People's Republic of China on the 2013 National Economic
and Social Development, NAT'L BUREAU OF STAT. OF CHINA (20 Jan. 2014)
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201401/t20140120_502079.html.
84. Max Fisher, This surprising chart shows which countries own the most US debt, Wash. Post,
Oct. 10, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/ 2013/10/1 0/this-surprising-chart-
shows-which-countries-own-the-most-u-s-debt/.
85. Damien Sharkov, Russia, China, India to Launch Rival to World Bank, NEWSWEEK (Jul. 9,
2014), http://www.newsweek.com/russia-china-india-ready-launch-rival-world-bank-258058.
86. "Rise of South" Transforming Global Power Balance, Says 2013 Human Development
Report, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME (Mar 14, 2013),
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreeases/201 3/03/14/-rise-of-south-
transforming-global-power-balance-says-2013-human-development-report.html.
87. Martin Jacques, The Death of Doha Signals the Demise of Globalisation, THE GUARDIAN
(Jul. 13, 2006), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/ju/1 3/comment.globalisation.
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has full faith in the wisdom of the "Washington Consensus." 88
B. Climate Change
The overwhelming global scientific consensus is that human behavior is
influencing climate change in a way that is dangerous for the health and wellbeing
of our species. 89 This year is likely to be the hottest in known history. 90 The polar
ice caps are melting at an incredible rate and threatening to raise sea levels
worldwide, imperiling substantial portions of many of Earth's most densely
populated metropolises. 91
As stated above, the WTO has very little to say about environmental
regulations, and even less power to enforce them.9' For an institution that aspires
to dictate global norms, this is unacceptable. A trade regime that does not
recognize and prioritize the survival of our species and make enforceable demands
in line with that mandate cannot expect to be deferred to in a future inevitably
marked by environmental calamity. On the contrary, a regime which deems such
pressing concerns unworthy of attention may well be understood in retrospect as
being much of the problem. Regional, bilateral, and even non-governmental
agreements will-as they have already been doing-be made to step in to fill the
void and establish new means for imposing restrictions on the most harmful
economic policies.
V. CONCLUSION
When Jagdish Bhagwati warned of the danger posed by an overwhelming
multitude of PTAs, 93 he was correct in believing that these would dilute the
multilateral system proffered by the WTO. As the failure of the Doha talks and the
resultant deferral to PTAs in their wake has clearly demonstrated, that dilution has
resoundingly occurred. More importantly though, that PTAs were occurring at the
time of the WTO's formation, and that they have occurred with increasing
frequency ever since, is ample demonstration that few if any ever really wanted or
believed in the promise of the WTO in the first place.
88. See generally, STEVEN ORTLEPP, A NEW LOOK AT THE PROPHECIES OF DANIEL 153 (2010)
89. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and Ill to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC (2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYRAR5 FINAL-full.pdf.
90. Carol J. Williams, 2014 set to be hottest year on record, U.N. climate agency reports, L.A.
Times, Dec. 3, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-world-climate-20141203-story.html
(last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
91. Zoe Schlanger, Antarctica Ice Sheet Sheds an Everest of Ice Every Two Years: Study,
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 5, 2014) http://www.newsweek.com/key-ice-sheet-antarctica-losing-everest-sized-
volume-ice-every-two-years-study-289669
92. See generally, Vandana Shiva, WTO deemed unfit for environmental management, UNIV. OF
WOLLONGONG (Mar. 24, 1994),
http://www.uow.edu.au/-sharonb/STS300/equity/economic/WTOnews/wtonews4.html.
93. Bhagwati, supra note 2.
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